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ABSTRACT 
The English mercantile house of Gibbs emerged alongside many other foreign 
merchant houses in the years after independence in South American countries, and they 
were active mostly in Peru, holding a virtual monopoly on Peruvian guano, from 1842 
until 1861. Unlike many other merchants who dealt with private companies, Gibbs 
worked directly on a commission basis with the government of Peru and loaned money to 
the government in advance of sales. By the time Gibbs left the guano trade in 1861, the 
government was the stronger party. South American societies regarded the foreign 
merchants as parasites, “producing and contributing nothing.” Yet merchants were 
critical to trade in South America in the nineteenth century. Historians have countered the 
arguments, especially in the second half of the twentieth century when interest in South 
America peaked, that they were simply middlemen who never contributed to the trade. 
They moved goods, performed specialized functions that local businessmen were not 
equipped to handle, and bore the risk of transporting goods from producers to consumers 
overseas. They had access to contacts, overseas markets, money, and credit. The house of 
Gibbs was typical in that they had the money, contacts, sources, and personnel located in 
South America, and they performed similar day-to-day tasks of other foreign merchants. 
Gibbs was atypical, however, because they worked directly with the government on a 
commission basis and the government dictated the terms of their contracts, including how 
long they could export guano, where they could export it to, how much they could sell it 
for, and how much they could take. As will be seen in the case of the guano trade in Peru, 
iii 
the large, foreign mercantile houses, especially Gibbs, were critical to the survival of the 
trade. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“L’odeur de l’ordure dure òu l’or dort./ 
The stench of shit lingers where gold sleeps.”1 
 
In the sixteenth century, Spanish conquistadores traveled to South America in 
search of “God, gold, and glory,” although they were slightly more concerned with 
finding gold. Before the Spanish arrived, guano, the excrement of seabirds, was used as a 
fertilizer by the Inca. It was taken mostly, but not always, from three large islands off the 
coast of Peru known as the Chincha Islands, about 90 miles from Lima. It was so 
valuable to the Inca they executed people for traveling to the islands and disturbing the 
birds. After the arrival of the conquistador Francisco Pizarro in the 1530’s, less emphasis 
was placed on agriculture and silver became the primary export. The guano off the coast 
was largely left ignored on the Chinchas. It was exported only on a very small, national 
scale. An historian estimated in the early twentieth century that during the years of 
Spanish rule, only about 1,700 tons of guano were sold in Peru, meaning the guano 
continued to accumulate for years on the islands where the birds nested.
2
 
 Direct colonial rule lasted 300 years, and as Spanish rule began severely waning 
in the 1800’s, so too did the silver exports. In the 1820’s, the republics one by one 
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declared their independence from Spain. It was only after the establishment of the 
Republic of Peru that the importance of guano was recognized again. In 1830, the 
government decreed an abolition of duties and charges on guano brought into the country 
from the islands, declaring it to be an article “very useful and necessary for the 
development and prosperity of agriculture.” Guano soon became one of the most 
important branches of industry in Peru. The Peruvian Minister of Finance wrote in 1858: 
“So great is the value of this branch of the national riches, that without exaggeration it 
may be affirmed that on its estimation and good handling depend the subsistence of the 
State, the maintenance of its credit, the future of its increase, and the preservation of the 
public order.”3At the time the Minister of Finance proclaimed guano’s importance to the 
country, the commodity was bringing into Peru “riches beyond the wildest dreams of 
Francisco Pizarro and his fellow Spanish conquistadores.”4 
 Shortly after independence and coincidentally at the same that European countries 
were at war with each other, foreign merchants flocked to South America in huge 
numbers to try to make a profit selling European products. A few were successful, but 
most failed miserably and were forced to return home. They encountered high taxes in 
the years following independence from Spain, but even when taxes began decreasing the 
foreign merchants still faced the problem of selling to a very small market. Most of the 
purchasing power lay in a very small elite in each country while the majority of the 
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population remained poor and far removed from the main cities. Merchants also faced 
many risks selling products abroad because of the lack of quick communication and 
transportation. They also faced hostility from local businessmen who were unable to 
conduct business because the foreign merchants had pushed them aside. 
 Many merchants traveled to South America, yet few were able to make a living 
there. Those that did became import and export houses that usually operated on 
consignment sale, a widespread South American practice leftover from Spanish rule. This 
meant they did not own the goods they shipped, and worked for commissions. The 
stronger, more established houses survived the first few decades after independence in 
South American countries because of their experience, knowledge of foreign markets, 
and large amounts of capital, and by the middle of the century they were dominating 
foreign trade in many countries. Brazilian rubber, Peruvian guano, Argentine grain and 
wool was dominated by foreigners.  
One of these stronger houses that survived into the middle of the century was the 
English house of Gibbs, founded in London in 1808 by Antony Gibbs. The Lima branch 
was established in 1822, and the partners of the branch entered the guano trade in Peru in 
1842. They were invited to participate because the cost to launch the guano trade required 
a significant amount of money and expertise that Peru nor the local businessmen had. 
Although they were not the only foreign contractors to sign the contract with Peru for the 
export of guano, they were most important to the trade because they could loan the 
largest amount of money to the government. Peru introduced “exclusive consignment 
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whereby competition was eliminated to maintain a higher level of prices.”5Since Peru 
owned the guano, the government allowed contractors to take a specified amount of 
guano in a certain amount of time and sell in a specified market. The contractors took 
commissions from the total proceeds, and in exchange they lent money to the government 
before the payments for guano arrived. This was the main advantage of merchant 
monopolies: “easy access to foreign money markets and capacity to lend generously in 
advance of sales.”6  
The international guano trade began in 1840 when local Peruvians approached the 
government about selling it overseas. Yet the expensive effort to launch the trade was out 
of reach for the businessmen. They did not have the money or contacts. It was therefore 
crucial for the foreign merchants to be involved. Gibbs were not the foreign merchants 
who initially helped the trade get started, but they joined two years later and brought 
together the much-needed factors of production including transportation, promotion, and 
sale overseas. Several years later, they were the only contractors who shipped to Britain. 
They were temporarily excluded from the French and Spanish markets, but shipped 
almost everywhere else in Europe. Their business expanded throughout the two decades 
they contracted with the government. It was because of the merchants the industry was 
able to get started, and it was also because of them, especially Gibbs, the guano industry 
was able to stay afloat.  
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It is interesting that guano took so long to become an international commodity 
since bird manure was not new, and had been sitting around for thousands of years. 
Furthermore, it was known at the time to have been used by the Inca as a fertilizer. When 
scientist Robert Coker visited the Chincha Islands in the early twentieth century, he 
counted nests within a 550-square mile radius, and estimated each pair of birds and their 
offspring produced $1.50 worth of guano. From there he calculated that each pair of 
breeding birds had a commercial value of $15.00 per year. His estimations were made 
after the guano trade, so at the start of the trade there was even more guano sitting on the 
islands. It is easy to appreciate the amount of wealth Peru had sitting on the islands in 
1840 when the trade began.
7
A few samples of guano were first imported into Liverpool 
in July of 1836 for experimentation on crops, and the results were very positive. The first 
commercial shipment into Britain was in 1841, and by 1847 it was Peru’s most important 
export.
8
 
  Throughout the guano age, which lasted about forty years, the principal market 
for guano was Great Britain, with the United States and then France close behind. After 
Europe, the market for cotton in America made “necessary a reliable means of renewing 
the exhausted soil of the southern plantation.”9Britain needed guano because of a 
pressing problem with soil degradation sparked by industrialization, “a system of 
                                                          
7
 Robert Cushman Murphy, Bird Islands of Peru: The Record of a Sojourn on the West Coast, (London: 
The Knickerbocker Press, 1925), 53-62.  
 
8
 Hollett, 82. 
  
9
 Bruce W. Farcau, The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884, 
(Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc., 2000), 9.  
 
 
 
6 
 
robbery” that took nutrients from the soil, “decreasing the productive potential of the 
land.”10In the 1800’s, European agricultural chemists and agronomists were warning 
people about the loss of nitrogen and other important nutrients in the soil through the 
transfer of foods to cities and urban areas. German scientist Justus von Liebig noted that 
the problem in Britain was “the discovery of the means of producing more bread and 
meat on a given surface, to supply the wants of a continually increasing population.” He 
further wrote that far too many people believed the soil to be inexhaustible, and they saw 
guano as the answer to their problems rather than what it was: a temporary substitute to 
repair the problem of soil degradation.
11
It replaced the nutrients in the soil that had been 
depleted as industrialization expanded in more advanced countries, notably the United 
Kingdom.
12
  
Soil degradation sparked an international guano rush, “as agriculturalists sought 
the precious fertilizer to compensate for the soil nutrients they were losing.”13Peruvian 
guano was better than guano from anywhere else in the world because of its high nitrogen 
content. The Peruvian coast is the driest place on the planet, and there is scarcely any 
rainfall to wash away the nitrogen and other elements in the guano deposits.
14
Although 
guano could be found in the Caribbean, the Pacific Ocean, parts of Asia, and off the coast 
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of Southwest Africa, Peruvian guano was by far the most valuable guano in the world, 
and after the first commercial shipment of it to the British market in 1841, Europeans 
were hooked.
15
Guano quickly sold, even though it was selling at much higher prices at 
the time. It soon became the most popular fertilizer, and was in high demand by 
European farmers. The Earl of Derby was so happy with the results of guano on his fields 
that he bought an entire shipload for himself after his successful experiments. He 
“extolled its powers” before the Royal Agricultural Society, and used it on the usual 
crops, like potatoes, turnips, and oats, as well as on his raspberry bushes and apple 
trees.
16
 Another English farmer was so impatient to get guano for himself he stole a bag 
and scooped the guano by hand into a sack that he held open with his mouth. In his hurry, 
he accidentally ingested some, and was found dead the very next day.
17
 
 The first decade of the international guano trade was marked by constant 
bickering between contractors over price. In contrast to the policy of pricing in the 
following decade, the government always had to approve price changes in the 1840’s, but 
the contractors exercised more control in setting the prices. The 1840’s were also marked 
by competition from African guano, although it was short-lived. Guano was exported 
from the African islands into the British market at much lower prices, causing Gibbs and 
the other contractors to argue over prices. Gibbs did not chase short-term goals, one of 
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the characteristics of their firm that probably made them as successful as they were and 
stay in South America as long as they did. Other contractors were arguing for lowering 
the price of Peruvian guano to compete with the cheaper African guano, but Gibbs was 
adamant that they had to maintain a realistic, moderate price level throughout the threat 
of competition. Gibbs steadfastly did not reduce the price of guano, and demanded for a 
hold on a more realistic price. When it was over, the other contractors dropped out, and 
by the end of the 1840’s Gibbs had a virtual monopoly on Peruvian guano.  
Yet in the 1850’s, the government of Peru had stepped up and was more involved 
in the affairs of guano. Not only did they continue to dictate the conditions of the 
contracts with Gibbs, but at times Peru threatened to cancel their contracts altogether if 
they did not oblige with the government’s wishes. By the end of the second decade of the 
guano trade, guano was supplying a massive 80% of Peru’s revenue, whereas in the 40’s 
guano supplied only about 5%.
18
Between 1855 and 1864, Britain received guano from 
Peru valued to be over £20,000,000, a figure much greater than any other commodity 
imported from any other country in South America.
19
The waters around the Chincha 
Islands, calm and quiet only two decades earlier, were disturbed constantly by the 
presence of hundreds of ships flying flags from all over the world, waiting to take guano 
through Peruvian customs and to the foreign markets.
20
 It was a prosperous decade, and 
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guano sales peaked in 1856. Guano completely transformed Peru, and at the end of the 
decade Peru was a leading borrower on the London capital market. Their record of debt 
service was “stellar” because the country used guano revenues to service their foreign 
debt. The guano gave “credibility to Peruvian paper.” At the height of the trade, 
historians agree Lima was one of the richest cities in South America.
21
 
By the end of the decade, however, Gibbs had few friends and plenty of enemies 
in South America. Ultimately, the country turned against the foreigners, claiming they 
had taken too much profit for themselves while purposely keeping the country dependent 
on them, and keeping local businessmen out of the trade. Locals argued against Gibbs’ 
participation, claiming their enterprise was a barrier to economic development. This view 
persisted in the years after Gibbs left the trade and the local businessmen got the guano 
trade to themselves. However, as historians began arguing in the twentieth century, this 
was not entirely true. W.M. Mathew agrees that sometimes Gibbs made extra money 
from commissions simply from overseeing the trade or for overcharging for bags for the 
guano. The argument that they purposely kept Peru dependent on them, however, is 
ridiculous. Gibbs never had an interest in the affairs of Peru. They, like many other 
merchants, just wanted to make a living, and were not interested in the affairs of Peru. 
One historian, Jonathan Levin, argued that Gibbs purposely kept prices low because they 
got a commission from the total net proceeds. Theoretically, lower prices meant more 
people would buy which would lead to a higher total profit. Mathew and other historians 
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argue against this as well, saying if anything Gibbs was guilty of keeping prices higher. 
The government wanted them higher, and if Gibbs went against what the government 
wanted they could easily be fired as contractors. Furthermore, there was no guarantee 
lower prices would lead to more sales. 
When the topic of guano in Peru was revisited recently in the 2000’s, as interest in 
environmental studies peaked, historians revisited the issue and argued the accusations 
leveled against Gibbs for their conduct in the trade were really more emotionally-based 
than fact-based. They agree it was easy for Gibbs to be a scapegoat, but it was the 
government’s choice to spend the money from guano the way they did, keep Gibbs in the 
trade for as long as they did, and dictate the prices. On top of this, they argued the 
government did not try to protect the environment, and only tried to help the birds by 
killing their natural predators, which only caused harm to the ecosystem. When the trade 
ended, a traveler visited some of the smaller guano islands, and noted with dismay that 
equipment was just strewn around “as if they had been thrown down with curses.”22 
At the end of the guano trade, which lasted until the 1870’s even though Gibbs 
left in 1861, Peru was in no better shape than it was when the trade began. It was not 
Gibbs’ fault that the government spent money the way it did. Not only was their economy 
centered around the export of a single product, but the income from that commodity, as 
large as it was, was not used efficiently. Levin agrees with Mathew, D.C.M. Platt, and 
other historians that the guano ended up being a “wasted opportunity” for Peru. The 
export taxes and revenue were used to pay off bondholders and debts, but it was also used 
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to fund state pensions, the armed forces, and the construction of national public works. 
Peru was frequently tense with the countries surrounding it, and was preoccupied for 
most of the guano trade with building up the armed forces in case of the outbreak of war. 
There was never a legitimate stimulus for domestic production. Any opportunities for 
growth came, and then quickly went.
23
Furthermore, although Peru was spending so much 
money to pay off debt, the country was so caught up in the endless cycle of borrowing 
money so far in advance of guano sales, that the country remained permanently in debt to 
foreigners all the way up to the twentieth century. In the 1870’s, Peru defaulted on her 
loans.
24
The merchant monopolies which allowed Peru to borrow money before sales 
proved to be a curse for the young country of Peru, because the financial difficulty of the 
country rested on mortgaging future guano sales rather than trying to “stabilize the 
internal structure of the country and organizing a solid financial system based on taxes.”25 
The government was somewhat reluctant to give the trade to anyone else because 
they knew they could rely on Gibbs for such large loans before guano sales. Amid 
mounting dissatisfaction from local Peruvians, when the contract with Gibbs ended in 
1861, it was not renewed, and it instead went to local businessmen. When their time in 
the trade ended, the “physical spread of their business was wider…and larger” than ever. 
Their control extended over almost the entire European market, Africa, the West Indies, 
                                                          
23
 Roberto Cortés Conde and Shane J. Hunt, ‘Growth and Guano in Nineteenth-Century Peru,’ The Latin 
American Economies: Growth and the Export Sector 1880-1930, (New York City: Homes & Meier 
Publishers Inc., 1985), 255. 
   
24
 Hollett, 18.  
 
25
 Ibid., 111.  
 
 
12 
 
Australia, and the Indian Ocean.
26
By all accounts, however, Gibbs was not very upset 
about leaving, and they began expanding their business in other countries, especially 
Chile. Yet the way the small family enterprise had dominated “one of the great trades of 
the international economy in the mid-nineteenth century is probably without 
precedent.”27 
It is worth noting, however, that the Peruvian government began this relationship 
with English contractors shortly after becoming independent from Spain. For the majority 
of Peru, they may have seen this relationship with Gibbs as a kind of substitution of 
power, and felt that Britain had merely replaced Spain’s previous hold on the South 
American countries in a more informal way. Unlike Spain, a country which controlled 
South America in a very direct and territorial way, Britain’s rule was indirect. Although 
Peru was independent, the country still needed the support of Britain, indicating the 
unequal amount of power in the relationship between Peru and Britain. Regardless of 
Peru’s status of owners of guano, their decision to keep Gibbs involved for their ready 
supplies of cash, and the strength of the government’s position in their contracts, there 
existed an imbalance of power between Peru and Britain. 
The principal guano labor was conducted by a variety of workers, including 
convicts, a handful of slaves, and Chinese workers called “coolies.” The use of slavery in 
the guano industry in Peru raises the issue of capitalism and how the industry was 
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fundamental to the development of modern capitalism on a global scale, an issue 
explored in Sven Beckert’s book, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (2014). Beckert 
argues that the importance of cotton in the American South permeated to other countries. 
One aspect of this “Empire of Cotton” is slavery. Beckert explains that this slavery and 
violence, as well as the pushing of people off their lands in order to make way for cotton, 
happened on a global scale, and outlines similar situations in countries like Egypt and 
Mexico to show that the government interfered for the sake of what he calls “war 
capitalism.” He also makes the case that cheaper labor is in higher demand, and violence 
is not separated from this commitment to cheap labor. This argument can be further 
explored and applied to the Chinese coolies in Peru. As the slaves on plantations in the 
American South were performing back-breaking labor to outsource one single 
commodities to other countries, the Chinese coolies were similarly laboring under violent 
conditions as cheap labor to ship the commodity of guano to people all over the world. 
Gibbs appeared to be in control since they were much more involved with the 
loading, shipping, and selling of guano. Yet the government was the stronger party, and 
historians agree it was ultimately the fault of the government that the guano trade 
collapsed. High prices that the government insisted on in the 1850’s meant farmers were 
becoming more irritated and looking for substitutes. Hence, the demand for artificial 
fertilizers grew until in the 1860’s, they were becoming the new favorite fertilizers on the 
European markets. These fertilizers had not been much of a threat when the trade began 
because they were so underdeveloped. With so little “ammoniacal material coming out of 
 
 
14 
 
European and American factories, it meant Peru had a monopoly in nitrogenous fertilizer, 
and Gibbs had a monopoly on selling it to its principal market, Great Britain.
28
 
Peru was not the “passive, innocent victim” it appeared to be in the many years 
following the guano trade. In the twentieth century, historians began studying the guano 
trade and the role Gibbs had played in it, and began questioning the argument that Gibbs 
was to blame for Peru’s fate following the trade’s end. W.M. Mathew questioned to what 
extent Gibbs could really be blamed. Critics were quick to blame the dominant mercantile 
body that sold guano overseas, and were angry that the government was so dependent on 
the more powerful European countries. These critics ignored the fact that to launch the 
guano trade, Peru needed merchants with their contacts, expertise, and, most importantly, 
their money. They kept Gibbs in the trade because of the unique relationship that Peru 
and Gibbs shared. Peru owned the guano, and for Gibbs to sell it they had to loan to Peru 
a specified amount of money before guano payments came in. Local Peruvian 
businessmen simply did not have the financial backing Gibbs did, so the government kept 
signing contracts with Gibbs because they became dependent on the loans and the entire 
process of borrowing money. They dropped Gibbs once there was too much criticism 
over the fact that locals were barely involved in the guano trade. It appeared Gibbs 
controlled the trade, but research beginning in the 1960’s and 1970’s shows it was the 
government who was in control. Despite the fantastic amount of wealth guano brought it, 
                                                          
28
 Mathew, The House of Gibbs and the Peruvian Guano Monopoly, 1.  
 
 
15 
 
much of the guano trade was characterized by “miscalculation, failure and wasted 
opportunity.”29 
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CHAPTER 1: BEFORE THE DAWN OF THE GUANO AGE: 
The House of Gibbs, The Emergence of the Merchants in Post-Colonial South 
America, and Peru in the Years Before the Age of Guano 
 
The House of Gibbs: A Brief History 
 
The long and prosperous history of the English mercantile house of Antony Gibbs 
and Sons begins with its founder, Antony. Born in Exeter, England in 1756, the sixth out 
of eleven children, Antony was the fifth son of George Abraham and Dorothea Barnetta 
Hucks Gibbs.
30
  George Abraham was a wealthy landowner and well-known surgeon 
whose family had been commercially active in the Exeter port for more than two hundred 
years. He was a man of principles who inculcated an ethic of hard-work and patience into 
his children, and Antony revered him.
31
After being educated at Exeter Grammar School, 
Antony was apprenticed to a Mr. Brook, whose successful woollen business extended 
into Spain. Under Mr. Brook’s guidance, Antony learned Spanish, although to what 
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extent is unclear. He learned about the importing and exporting business, and became 
more familiar with the ports the goods were sent to.
32
 
 When his apprenticeship ended, most likely in 1778, Antony borrowed some 
capital from his supportive father and set up his own woollen manufacturing business 
with both the warehouse and his office located in Exeter.
33
He gained a partner in his 
developing business named Samuel Banfill, but Antony remained the primary figure and 
partner. Banfill traveled more while Antony stayed mostly in London.
34
  Antony married 
Dorothea Barnetta Hucks in 1784, and the couple had five children. Two of their sons, 
George Henry (1785-1842) and William (1790-1875), later worked with their father in 
his business.
35
 William later became a principal partner in his father’s firm, a well-known 
businessman in Peru, and a wealthy man in England.
36
   
 In 1786, Antony was appointed to a committee along with 26 other merchants to 
deal exclusively with the “illicit importation of wool,” the export of which was prohibited 
in England from 1660-1825.
37He had also ascended from mere ‘assistant’ to ‘master’ in 
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“The Incorporation of Weavers, Fullers, and Shearmen” of the Tuckers’ Hall in Exeter. 
By this time, Antony was an exceptional, well-liked businessman, but he was 
unfortunately bankrupt by 1789. The reasons for the failure of his business are not 
entirely clear, but it is most likely that excessive spending and a considerable amount of 
negligence to the business were the reasons for its’ short life.38 Regardless of its lifespan, 
it was a blessing in disguise, according to Gibbs’ descendent John Arthur Gibbs, since it 
led to the establishment of the London house and later the South American branches.
39
   
 Antony was not a quitter, and he decided to reestablish his business. In a letter to 
his father, Antony understood “the enormous errors into which I have fallen…I will go to 
great lengths in order to obtain what I so heartily wish, and I have great prospects of my 
succeeding.”40  In search of a new market, he moved to Madrid, and from 1792 to 1807, 
Antony traveled extensively between England, Portugal, and Spain as a commercial agent 
for British manufactures. He collected orders, visited with potential buyers, and received 
money when it was due. He took on some importing on his own account, and his 
financial situation drastically improved. In 1793, Antony entered into a partnership with 
Juan Pomar of Malaga, and the pair successfully exported produce, mostly wines and 
fruits, from Spain to England until 1803.
41
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 The beginning of the nineteenth century was characterized by warfare between 
England, Spain, and France. Unsurprisingly, Antony’s business began to feel the effects 
of war, and through his “Spanish connections” his attention was drawn to South America, 
where business looked more promising as new trading opportunities appeared when 
Spanish colonial rule began to decline and where entrance into the economy was easier 
because of his access to capital and his “readiness to assume risks.”42Antony arranged for 
his stocks, around £20,000 in value, to be held by a Spanish firm. The goods were 
nominally in Spanish ownership, and had to be shipped to South America in a Spanish 
vessel, but a British naval blockade meant his merchandise could potentially be seized. 
Antony’s older brother, Sir Vicary Gibbs, was then Soliciter-General, and he secured for 
Antony a license guaranteeing his safe passage from Spain to Lima and then back to 
England. It is unclear why Antony chose to go to Peru, but on Christmas Eve in 1806 he 
left aboard the Hermosa Mexicana. This was the beginning of the house of Gibbs in 
Peru.
43
 
 Antony briefly spent time in Peru before returning to London, where he 
established Antony Gibbs and Son with his oldest son George Henry in 1808.
44
 He was 
extremely proud to open the business with his son, and had high hopes for the future of 
his company. He wrote to a friend “I have good hopes that we shall soon do business of 
considerable consequence…If I should ever have it in my power to be of service to you 
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or your House it will always give me pleasure to open connections with people whom I 
so much esteem.”45His second son William joined in 1813, and the name was restyled to 
Antony Gibbs and Sons.
46
Building on the foundations of the establishment in London, 
the firm set up a number of different branches of Antony Gibbs and Sons over the years 
in Gibralter, Cadiz, Guayaquil, Tachna, Santiago, Arequipa, Callao, and Valparaíso.  
 The Lima branch of Antony Gibbs and Sons was called Gibbs Crawley Moens 
and Company, and was established in 1822.
47
Charles Crawley, one of the partners, was a 
nephew of Antony’s who entered the firm as an office clerk in 1814, the year before 
Antony’s death.48He only worked in the firm until 1833. According to a letter from 
George Henry in London to Charles ten years earlier, he never showed “lively interest in 
the business.” George Henry wrote that he and his brother William had an advantage in 
having been raised in the business, and their minds were “constantly employed in 
thinking how we may improve.” He added that his lack “of interest and pleasure in the 
thing leads you to think less of it; you do not investigate matters closely.”49 
The other partner, John Moens, was a very popular and respected businessman 
who managed the house in its earliest days.  He was sent to Lima about a year before the 
branch opened to scout out the area to see how profitable he thought it could serve as a 
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location for a branch of the firm. His main task was to take advantage of any trading 
opportunities that arose from the changes in colonial commercial policy. After so much 
warfare, Spain no longer had the capacity to satisfy “the commodity needs of her 
colonies.”50Without Spain, the newly independent (or almost independent) republics had 
to trade directly with Britain. Their clientele outside Europe drastically increased in the 
years before the establishment of the Lima branch, and of those clients 11 were in Lima. 
This prompted the Gibbs brothers to explore the capital location, but they did not feel 
they could make the journey themselves since the firm was still relatively small and they 
felt they were more needed in London. Moens was sent instead. Despite Moens’ 
popularity, he had poor business ethics and lacked proper judgment and clerical ability. 
In 1824, his partnership was reduced and in 1829 he left, and the firm became Gibbs 
Crawley and Company.
51
  
The house was “well-placed for securing South American produce for 
consignment to Gibbs in London, and for receiving British goods which could be re-
exported to the trans-Atlantic colonies.” They operated as commission merchants, with 
about four-fifths of their commission earnings coming directly from sales of foreign 
produce in Lima.
52
Despite a brief financial panic in the middle of the 1820’s, Gibbs 
emerged from the chaos with its credit unimpaired, while other merchant houses were not 
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so fortunate because their losses were too great, and they had not managed their money 
better or prepared well enough for the possibility of a financial crisis. Their reputation 
was positively circulated in London business circles, and clients were continuously 
satisfied with their services. They trusted Gibbs with their money and affairs, even at the 
worst of times. They were well-liked and respected, and were known for their patience 
and “cautious maxims.”53They still had 86 clients in Spain even at the end of the 1820’s, 
even though they started withdrawing from Spain. The Cadiz branch was closed in 1827, 
and the Gibraltar branch closed in 1833.
54By the 1830’s, the House of Gibbs was one of 
the most established, successful trading companies in South America.   
 
The Introduction of the Merchants in South America 
 
When Spain ruled the present-day South American countries, foreign merchants 
were not normally allowed to trade with the Spanish-controlled territories. Most of the 
trade that did successfully take place between Britain and Spanish America was 
contraband. In the years between 1809 and 1830, almost all of Spain’s former colonies 
won their independence, and as Spanish control gradually declined, more British 
merchants began legally trading with the new republics. In Peru, for example, native-born 
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and non-Spanish foreigners began opening businesses and engaging in foreign trade in 
1821, the year the country gained its’ independence.55 
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, as many foreigners flocked to South 
America seeking new trading opportunities, most of them journeyed overseas with the 
plan that the former Spanish colonies were only a “short-term problem” to temporarily 
restricted European markets that occurred in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars and the 
Industrial Revolution. Their need for new markets coincided with the relinquishing of 
Spanish control and monopoly trading rights previously held by chartered trading 
companies, which created a “commercial vacuum” that European merchants were 
desperate to fill.
56
 In a letter to George Canning on December 27 in 1826, Charles Milner 
Ricketts wrote that the British were “not regular mercantile houses who had 
corresponding branches in these countries, but were the manufacturers, who from dull 
sales in England had quantities of merchandize on hand which it was important to them 
to get rid of at any price, and they took their chance on the South American market.”57At 
first, the merchants were merely seizing the opportunities, but some became much more 
established and much larger in South America, including the house of Gibbs. By the early 
1830’s, British merchants were clustered at the principal cities and ports to conduct 
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international trade. They began selling British manufactured goods and textiles overseas, 
importing low-cost raw materials, and exporting local commodities.
58
  
The development of international trade with Latin America meant more 
intermediaries were required to transfer the goods to overseas consumers from producers. 
The rise of “money economies and distance problems” meant specialized functions had to 
be performed by merchants who were important as middlemen in the import and export 
trade for their knowledge of foreign markets.
59
The rise of export houses replaced the 
“older domestic channels, and redirected the flow of trade.” Merchants worked for 
commissions rather than owning the goods being shipped and dealt with. Consignment 
sale was extremely popular in the nineteenth century in South America. Sellers usually 
preferred to retain ownership of their merchandise until it was sold overseas to 
consumers, so they consigned their items to merchant houses, like Gibbs, who worked on 
a commission basis and exported commodities without owning them.
60
 
The opportunities foreign merchants were so desperate to grab in South America 
came with many risks, partly because merchants were organized without limited liability. 
They were usually set up as either individual proprietorships or partnerships with 
specified shares of profits or losses and how much money they could withdraw.
61
Many 
merchants eagerly went to South America in search of profits, yet most failed and 
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returned to their homelands. In the same letter from Charles Milner Ricketts to George 
Canning in December of 1826, he concluded that merchants were too enthusiastic at first 
when “the returns which were at first remitted greatly exceeded their expectations…They 
did not reckon, however, on the evils which necessarily followed.”62Most were met with 
disappointment. There were several reasons for the rate of failure merchants in the newly 
independent countries. Firstly, arbitrary regulations and high taxes existed on British 
imports in the years after independence.
63If they did not pay the “heavy contributions,” 
then merchants were “threatened with the deprivation of his right of acting as a 
consignee.”64 In 1825, for example, the tax on most British imports was 35%. Secondly, 
before the dawn of fast communication and overseas transportation, selling products 
abroad was a very risky business.
65
Merchants had to be able to foresee fluctuations in 
prices, because there was so much time that lapsed between buying, shipping, and 
receiving a product. Market forces were completely out of their control, and the 
possibility that world prices would fall in the very long amount of time between buying 
and receiving products created a huge risk.
66
Reports could drastically change in the time 
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it took for products to ship. The Panama Canal was not opened yet, so the shipping route 
for countries on the Western coast went around Cape Horn. 
Many merchants also made the common error of misjudging the size of their 
markets, especially in Peru where the majority of the population was living in poverty 
and were not even closely located to the major cities. They mistakenly believed that “the 
magnitude of commercial interest” implied “manipulation.”67Some of the wealthier 
people, the “old Spaniards,” left after independence, leaving only a small handful of 
people “of very limited means” left to purchase products.68Independence did not 
accelerate an increase in the population or lead to a demand for products. Income was not 
drastically redistributed, and only a very small, wealthy, and sophisticated elite “in the 
major cities wanted and could afford imported luxuries.” Furthermore, South American 
exports primarily went overseas. Very few were consumed locally. There was also the 
issue of political stability in the new countries as government underwent significant 
changes that sometimes made it difficult for merchants to conduct business. They were 
frequently the targets of local hostilities. They were blamed by both producers and 
consumers, the former believing he was being underpaid and the latter claiming he paid 
too much.
69
  
Their involvement at every level of commerce pushed out local businessmen who 
might have had the capital, and the advantages held by foreign houses meant there was 
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less room for the locals. They were constantly shoved aside by bigger, strong foreign 
houses. Local businessmen became very prominent in the handling of goods in the 
production phase, between producers and merchants. This was the case with Gibbs, who 
left the process of extracting and loading guano to Peruvian landowning 
businessmen.
70
Even though locals had an advantage in that they were more familiar with 
the country, the commodities, and the local contacts, it mattered very little when there 
were not yet local banks and they could not get any credit without 
merchants.
71
Furthermore, insurance and shipping were all foreign-owned, and since there 
were not local banks in existence in the first half of the nineteenth century, banking was 
dominated by foreigners as well. Small firms in Latin America that sprang up mostly in 
the second half of the century usually could not get credit without the name of a well-
known foreign, usually British, firm attached to their documents, vouching for them and 
their ability to conduct business and repay loans.
72
Without foreign merchants, many 
trades, including guano, would not have had such successful outcomes. 
 
 
 
How Did Gibbs Compare to Other Merchant Houses?  
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It is undeniable that Latin American countries needed the merchants to “promote 
and maintain economic development…after Independence.” The newly independent 
countries still lacked capital and expertise, and the foreign merchants brought both to 
South America in large numbers.
73
They took advantage of the lack of local 
entrepreneurship and infrastructure “to create the complementary businesses needed for 
their trading houses. If they wanted shipping or insurance facilities, they had to arrange 
them. If they wanted better produce to improve trade, they often had to invest in growing 
it themselves.” They imported consumer goods and capital, and were involved in a wider 
range of services normally associated with their respective businesses, like insurance, 
shipping, credit, and banking.
74
Gibbs, like other merchants, applied their skills to sectors 
of the economy, like insurance for example, because of the lack of entrepreneurship at the 
local level. They became involved in other areas of trade rather than simply import and 
export.
75
  
As many merchants as there initially were in South America after Spanish control 
dwindled away, by the 1850’s the number was significantly smaller. Those that remained 
were mostly active in Brazil and Argentina, and there were a few who survived on the 
Pacific coast including Gibbs, Graham Rowe, Duncan Fox, and Balfour Williamson. Like 
many of the other merchants who tried to succeed in South America, these few surviving 
large mercantile houses did not think South America was to be a permanent trading 
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establishment, but merely a temporary solution. They made a fortune off their exploits in 
South America while most others failed, however, and were soon extremely important to 
the economies of the South American republics. Compared to the foreign mercantile 
houses that survived, Gibbs was very similar to the other houses.
76
  
 These houses prospered well into the second half of the century. They were all 
mostly heterogenous in the first half of the nineteenth century, meaning that they tended 
to specialize in the trading of one commodity like coffee, guano, or port wine. By the 
1870’s, more merchant houses had become “hybrid,” and had greatly expanded their 
interests. Rather than simply sticking to the export of one commodity, they shipped 
multiple commodities and acted as insurance and shipping agents.
77
They also tended to 
have what historian Geoffrey Jones refers to as a “host region,” where they operated and 
became accustomed to the customs, cultures, and markets. Gibbs, for example, was 
mostly located in Peru, but by the end of the century their major host region became 
Chile.
78
Similarly, Balfour Williamson’s host region was also in Chile, as well as the 
United States.
79
  
Gibbs was typical to other foreign mercantile houses in that the government was 
dependent on them for several reasons, one of them being their economic expertise. 
Gibbs had a good reputation for business in Europe, and had been in the import and 
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export business for several years. They almost never got involved with politics of the 
countries they were active in, although there was an instance in Mexico where alien 
traders were very involved in politics. Gibbs was also disinterested in identifying with the 
countries in which they operated, like many other merchants. Some, for example the 
Edwards in Chile, lived in the countries in which they conducted businesses and married 
into South American families, but many, including Gibbs, preferred not to. They sent 
representatives to conduct business and set up branches of their firms in South America, 
but never lived there. It was all simply business.
80
They also hired clerks, managers, and 
other assistants from their native countries rather than hiring locals in their 
businesses.
81
They were more concerned with the economic matters of their home 
countries rather than in Latin America. Almost every foreign-owned merchant firm was a 
branch of a parent firm, with headquarters located somewhere in Europe, as was the case 
with Gibbs whose parent branch was in London. Additionally, Gibbs was typical in that 
merchants usually had their sources, money, capital, and contacts located in Europe 
rather than in South America. They were atypical in that they had a much closer 
relationship to the Peruvian government because they were the owners of the commodity 
being shipped, as we shall later see. 
 
Before the Age of Guano in Peru 
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 At the dawn of the guano age, Peru was still relatively new and Peruvian 
commerce was in a very poor, slow condition. Economic activity revolved around a very 
small percentage of Peruvians, which constituted the tiny, wealthy elite. The government 
was “impoverished, as well as illiberal.” They did not have the funds to develop the 
economy, and they lacked the expertise and proper leadership to manage it differently.
82
 
In addition to a need for capital, there was also the need for entrepreneurship. It was a 
“scarce and socially repressed quality” in South America, and especially in 
Peru.
83
Furthermore, knowledge of overseas markets was scarce, and there were no banks 
in existence. There was no capital market “through which savings could be mobilized for 
use in the most profitable undertakings.”84It is undeniable that Peru needed the foreign 
merchants for the guano trade.  
 Independence was costly for the South American nations, Peru included. Like 
many other South American nations after Independence, Peru incurred a massive debt 
almost immediately. They borrowed tremendous amounts of money from overseas. The 
bonds were issued through mercantile houses, and carried interest. Almost all the 
countries, including Peru, defaulted on their loans in the first decade after their 
independence.
85
 In 1837, the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation Between His 
Late Majesty and the Peru-Bolivian Confederation was signed between Peru and Britain 
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in June, which allowed for the opening of the international guano trade and the 
involvement of the foreign merchants. Article II of this treaty guaranteed that the subjects 
of both countries were legally allowed to “come with their ships and cargoes to all ports 
in either country…restrictive duties would not be placed on importers by either side…All 
merchants…shall have the liberty to manage their own affairs themselves, or to commit 
them to the management of whomsoever they please.”86   
 By the 1840’s, right before guano began being exploited on a large scale, the 
greatest part of Peruvian foreign business was in the hands of foreigners with their 
headquarters predominantly in Lima. They were mostly British, but there was a sizeable 
number of French firms present, as well. On a much smaller scale, a few German, Italian, 
and North American houses could be found.
87
Peru was virtually bankrupt by the start of 
the guano trade. The country was unable to pay back foreign creditors. Their financial 
difficulties were greatly aggravated by the costly warfare that various military regimes 
frequently engaged in with neighboring countries. Between 1828 and 1841, Peru fought a 
series of battles with Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia. The country was spending 
large amounts of money it really did not have on wars. With their mineral production in a 
steady decline and no proper banking system in the country, Peru was financially 
dependent on foreign merchants and bankers.
88The country’s economy soon changed 
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when a Peruvian businessman approached the government about the international sale of 
guano. 
  
 
 
34 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE BEGINNING OF THE TRADE:  
A Brief History of Guano, the Start of the Guano Trade, Gibbs Enters the Trade, 
and the Threat of African Competition 
 
A Brief History of Guano 
 Today, native English speakers know what guano is because the term was made 
famous by Jim Carrey’s popular portrayal as the quirky pet detective in the 1995 film Ace 
Ventura: When Nature Calls. The term was used in the movie to refer to bat droppings, 
but it was originally a name for the excrement of seabirds. The word ‘guano’ is derived 
from the Quechua word ‘wanu,’ a “malodorous commodity” which the ancients held in 
high regard.
89
  
 Peruvian guano was at one point considered the most valuable fertilizer in the 
entire world, and for good reason: it was the most valuable in nutrients for plant growth. 
The reason why Peruvian guano has always been better than guano from anywhere else in 
the world is because of Peru’s unique environment on the West Coast. There is almost no 
rainfall. In fact, according to the Geology and Origin of the Chilean Nitrate Deposits, the 
annual rainfall on the West Coast could be as infrequent as less than a millimeter of rain 
ever five to twenty years, which means the nutrients never get washed away and literally 
bake in the sun so its most valuable components are “imprisoned for an indefinite period 
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of time.”90 About ninety miles from Lima lay a cluster of islands called the Chincha 
Islands, and these islands once had the greatest concentration of guano in the entire 
world. The Chincha Islands are made up of three islands, sometimes referred to as the 
North, Middle, and South Islands. The North Island was by far the biggest.
91
These 
islands were not the only guano islands off the coast of Peru, but they were the biggest 
and had the most guano. 
 The environment contained immense populations of the birds’ favorite foods, like 
plankton, anchovies, and herring.
92
These guano-producing birds, “innocent agents” in 
what would soon become a global trade, were mostly one species of pelican, two types of 
gannets, and the White-Breasted cormorant that was nicknamed the ‘guanay.’93These 
birds were “strictly creatures of the Humboldt Current” off the coast of Peru. With so 
much food around and their nests so close together on the islands, a lot of guano was 
deposited in just a short amount of time.
94
 Considering that the guano was hardly touched 
after the time of the Inca, there was a lot of wealth in the form of bird droppings off the 
coast of Peru. By 1870, the birds off the Peruvian coast were hailed as “the most valuable 
birds in the world.”95  
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 Animal manure may not be a topic to bring up in “polite conversation,’ but it has 
long been tremendously important as a fertilizer since the time of Paleolithic planters as 
early as 10,000 B.C.
96
Along with excrement, other popular fertilizers included bones, 
humus, chalk, and wood ash.
97
Bones, for example, were a very common type of fertilizer 
before the widespread use of guano. They were found to be rich in phosphates, but low in 
nitrogen. Like other fertilizers, bones were slower-acting and less soluble. They could 
only be applied to a small number of crops. The Inca used guano as a fertilizer, although 
physical evidence suggests the Inca were not the first people to use guano from the 
islands off the coast of Peru because of surviving relics found on and around the islands. 
Archaeologists believe the earliest human exploitation of guano deposits off the coast 
may have occurred during the time of the Mochica people between the first and fifth 
centuries A.D. It is difficult to tell if all groups of people who lived between the Mochica 
and Inca used guano and to what extent, but surviving accounts from the Inca indicate 
they were well aware of the properties of guano. They used it extensively as a fertilizer, 
and valued it immensely for the prosperity it brought to them.
98
 
 The Inca were so conservative with their guano that it was punishable by death for 
a person to journey to the guano islands during mating season or to disturb the birds in 
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any way.
99
 They also built warehouses to store the guano in case of shortage, and 
developed a system where certain parts of the islands were allocated to province. Each 
province would be given a certain amount of guano that they would distribute amongst all 
the farmers in the province. After the arrival of the conquistadores under Francisco 
Pizarro in the 1530’s, agriculture quickly went into a decline as the Spanish focus 
revolved around gold and silver exports.
100
 After the Inca, guano was used much less. 
Although Peruvian farmers sometimes used it, for the most part the guano deposits 
simply sat there, getting higher and higher as more droppings accumulated until the start 
of the international guano trade in the early 1840’s.  
 Guano was first introduced into European farming when a German scientist 
named Baron Friedrich Henrich Alexander von Humboldt traveled to Peru. He witnessed 
a few Peruvian farmers using guano on their lands, and thought maybe this was the secret 
to the plentiful, beautiful landscapes he had read about from the time of the Inca. He sent 
some samples back to France in 1803.
101
No conclusive evidence was ever presented 
about guano as a fertilizer, partly because there was still a lack of a drive to study guano 
in connection with agriculture, but other scientists followed Humboldt’s lead.102In 1804, 
a Swiss scientist, Nicholas Theodore de Saussure, argued plants simultaneously took 
carbon, oxygen, and nitrogen from the air, and minerals like calcium, phosphorus, 
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magnesium, and potassium from the soil. He published his findings, arguing plants 
needed all these elements to grow. The amount of any given element to plant life was not 
the important consideration, but rather “that a trace of one substance might be sufficient 
while larger quantities of other substances were needed.”103This publication was well 
received but not yet appreciated. The prevailing theory at the time argued instead that the 
fertility of plants came almost entirely from organic matter in the soil.
104
 Research done 
after de Saussure’s time later showed the importance of his experiments, and his 
argument became relevant again as scientists strove to “reconcile conflicting views.”105 
 The chemical composition of guano was tested to understand why it was such a 
better fertilizer compared to other methods of fertilization. Not only was guano soluble 
and fast-acting, but it was found to have higher concentrations of nitrogen and phosphate. 
Nitrogen, especially, is an important building block in chlorophyll, “which creates nearly 
all of the biological energy that derives life on earth.”106In 1813, an English professor 
named Sir Humphry Davy published a series of lectures titled Elements of Agricultural 
Chemistry in which he praised guano. He noted it was high in nitrogen and phosphorus, 
two of the three essential plant foods, and from its composition he found it “to be a very 
powerful manure.”  Nitrogenous manures, like guano, were an answer to a farmer’s 
prayers, Davy proclaimed, because “the manures from animal substances, in general, 
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require no chemical preparation to fit them for the soil.” It was easy to apply, and quickly 
“produced a powerful but transient effect on grass.”107 
 Right at the brink of the beginning of the international guano trade, guano was 
being praised in Europe. It was “more soluble, enabling it to push young plants ahead 
rapidly in the early, often crucial stages of their growth. It also performed effectively on 
heavy as well as light soils.”108In 1841, a professor of chemistry at Durham named James 
Johnston agreed with other scientists that “the greater part of the ingredients which are 
necessary to the growth of every variety of crop” could be found in guano, and the 
introduction of it into crops would “prove a great national service.”109In the same year 
Dr. Johnston concluded guano was without a doubt the strongest and most valuable 
fertilizer to be introduced to European crops, The Liverpool Times gave a significant 
amount of coverage to guano and its positive effects on plant life, proclaiming guano 
“was likely to become a considerable article of commerce…and is said to be the most 
powerful and concentrated of all manures.” Furthermore, “it produces very fine crops of 
turnips and grasses, and is particularly suited for the light land on which these crops are 
usually reared.” The French Board of Agriculture and Science also reported favorably on 
Peruvian guano, emphasizing its heavy yields and how quickly the plants grew, allowing 
farmers to take it to market as soon as possible and obtain the highest possible prices for 
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it.
110
Right as the first contracts were taking place to arrange for the international trade of 
Peruvian guano, it was gathering fame as the greatest fertilizer in the world. 
 
Guano Happens: The Start of the Guano Trade  
 The guano trade began in 1840 when a respected and prominent Peruvian national 
and entrepreneur named Don Francisco Quiroz approached the government of Peru about 
the exclusive privilege to export guano from the Chincha Islands.
111
Quiroz was president 
of the Lima Chamber of Commerce in 1840, and was one of the country’s few native 
entrepreneurs. He was more familiar than most native businessmen with the European 
methods of finance and commerce. While he could successfully provide a degree of 
“entrepreneurial impetus,” it was certainly not enough to launch the industry or even 
supply the basic personnel. Therefore, he had to join forces with those who 
could.
112Along with Quiroz were Carlos Barroilhet, a man of “obscure origin,” a French-
Peruvian named Aquiles Allier, the French firm of Dutez and Company, and the 
Liverpool house of William Myers and Company.
113
Barroilhet can be credited with 
bringing everyone together. He had faith in the selling power of guano from the 
beginning, and believed it could be “transformed into the purest gold.”114He did not have 
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the money to invest in it, nor did he have the selling contacts to profit off the sale of 
guano so he turned to an English merchant who lived in Chile named Horace Bland. 
 Bland was an associate of William Myers, the owner and main figure in the 
Liverpool firm of William Myers and Company. Along with Barroilhet and the French-
Peruvian Allier, Bland began discussing with Myers the potential of selling guano in 
Britain. Samples of Peruvian guano were passed on to Myers, who was a farmer as well 
as a businessman. He, along with others, used the samples of Peruvian guano, and the 
results were very encouraging. Guano was “more powerful than barnyard manure,” and 
Myers offered his management skills and financial support to Allier and 
Barroilhet.
115
Myers was optimistic about the potential profitability of guano in Britain, 
and confidently guessed he could sell it for £24 per ton. He ended up selling it for £18 a 
ton, roughly the equivalent of $90.00. Once the intermediate expenses were accounted 
for, like insurance, storage, loading, and freight, Myers and the other contractors were left 
with a very “handsome profit of £12 per ton.”116     
From the beginning, the trade was almost entirely in the hands of foreigners, but 
on paper it was in the hands of a Peruvian. If local businessmen knew that foreign 
merchants had been granted concession for the export of guano from the deposits, it 
would have aroused too much public hostility for the trade to continue.
117
Therefore, 
Quiroz served as the “respectable Peruvian frontman” who was crucial to the trade since 
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the arrangements with the government were made primarily in his name even though 
other merchants participated with him. The first contract was signed on November 10, 
1840. In this contract, the merchants could sell guano from any of the islands in any 
market for a period of 6 years. There were no limits as to how much guano had to be 
exported. The merchants were required to pay 40,000 pesos at once and another 10,000 at 
the end of the first and second years. Of the immediate 40,000 pesos, only, 1,500 were 
paid in cash and the rest was in debt certificates.
118
Guano sold on a very wide range in 
the first year of the trade, anywhere between £18 and £24 per ton. Most importantly, the 
government only received 5% after costs.
119
The conditions of the first contract clearly 
favored the merchants. Considering how much in commission the merchants made off 
selling guano in any markets they wanted after paying only 40,000 pesos immediately, 
the merchants clearly dominated the contract. This indicates the government was almost 
completely oblivious to the potential profitability of guano in Europe. However, they 
were also not informed about Myers’ experiments and the positive reception of guano by 
European farmers, so they probably had no reason to believe it was on the brink of 
becoming the most sought-after fertilizer in all of Europe.
120
   
Although the contract was signed in November of 1840, the first commercial 
consignment of guano did not go to Europe until March of 1841, when the vessel 
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Bonanza landed in England. The smell reportedly sent people “running to the hills.”121 
Guano was still not yet on the radar as a fertilizer, but the guano from the first shipment 
sold remarkably well. The response in Britain as favorable, and proved that a large, 
willing market existed that the Peruvian government did not know was there until 
November of 1841, a full year after the signing of the first contract, when a British ship 
docked in Callao. The ship, Dyron, brought word that guano was selling at the high price 
of £24 to £28 per ton overseas. The contract with the merchants was immediately 
annulled. Belford Wilson, the British chargé d’affaires, wrote to Lord Palmerston in 
December, after the annulment, to say that the government was unaware of guano’s 
value, and the contract had been annulled so that Peru could get the maximum possible 
sales from guano.
122
 
The second contract, then, made sure that the government got more in return for 
guano. Coincidentally, on the day of the signing of the second contract in 1841, Peru 
declared war on Bolivia. Belford Wilson wrote the government had obviously seen the 
advantage of scrapping the first contract and writing the second contract with the 
knowledge of how well guano sold in Europe “to fund a war against a neighboring 
Republic.” Upon the cancellation of the first contract, new bids were called for, but only 
one was received. It was a bid from the same members, now the party of Quiros Allier & 
Company. Gibbs had been approached about partaking in the trade by a Chilean merchant 
in Lima named Pedro de Candamo, who was consulted by the government about finding 
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parties who could offer more money. Gibbs, however, said no, since they were not 
confident enough in how well guano could sell.
123
  
In the second contract, the same parties agreed to advance the government 
287,000 pesos, roughly equivalent to £57,000, within 5 months against future profits.  
Furthermore, the government received about two-thirds of the total proceeds from the 
sales, an improvement on Peru’s part and a clear indication of their quickly growing 
dominance in the trade.
124
An advance loan this large could not have been made without 
foreign merchants, who had to provide the funds. This contract lasted very briefly, and 
was quickly annulled in favor of a third contract that would earn the government even 
more revenue and give them more power in the negotiations. The guano reserves were 
nationalized shortly after the signing of the second contract, officially making the guano 
the property of the Peruvian government.
125
 
 
Gibbs Enters the Guano Trade 
The third contract was signed in February of 1842, and this time, Gibbs was now 
party to it. The contract was between the government of Peru, the Lima branch of Gibbs 
Crawley & Co., the Lima branch of a French company Puymerol Poumarroux & Co., 
Myers & Co., and Quiros Allier & Co. They were allowed to export anywhere for 5 
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years, but had to give the government 200,000 pesos within 3 months of the contract 
being signed. A minimum of 120,000 tons of guano had to be disposed of by the end of 
their 5-year period. Day-to-day entrepreneurial functions were left up to them, as well. 
The terms of the third contract differed very much from the first contract in that the 
government was now the strong party. They now dictated the terms and conditions of the 
contracts, and were clearly taking in bigger loans from the contractors. Furthermore, if 
the merchants did not agree to the contract’s terms, the government could simply annul it 
and start over. This clearly shows the extent of their authority.
126
  
The Peruvian government operated under consignment just like many other 
nations. This was common in South America, and in international trade. Consignment 
contracts were awarded to exclusive country sales agents. The contractors paid large cash 
advances to the government, and arranged for the intermediate processes to take place, 
like loading, storage, and final sales. In return, they took a commission for intermediate 
costs and from the total sales proceeds. The foreign guano contractors, like many other 
commission agents, made their profits on a commission basis, which meant they received 
the guano and paid the government the proceeds due after deducting their costs and 
commissions. Consignment, used previously by the Spanish, was normal in international 
trading. The two characteristics of the guano trade that made it stand out from other 
trades in the nineteenth century was that Peru took their consignment one step further by 
introducing the monopoly-contract system, and the government owned the guano.  This 
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was not common in South America during the time, and because of this the contractors 
were frequently in contact with the government.
127
   
The granting of monopolies was also consistent with Peruvian tradition, and 
monopolies were granted liberally. It was a business method left over from Spanish rule. 
The Spanish used monopolies because they were a reliable source of income. Monopolies 
were considered perfectly normal, but there was a widespread South American reluctance 
to grant them to foreigners, which is why Don Francisco Quiroz was an important figure 
at the start of the guano trade.
128Peru’s usage of the monopoly-contract system meant that 
exclusive selling rights were awarded to contractors in certain markets, so the 
government could charge the highest possible price in each market since they did not 
have to worry about losing sales to cheaper competition. The monopoly-contract system 
of export was also used by the government to shape the contracts so that “its interests 
were guarded and advanced above all others.”129 
 Given the decline of the company to interact with the guano trade before the 
signing of the second contract, and the overall reluctance of entering the trade with Peru, 
it seems odd that the London house did not do more to deter the Lima branch from 
getting into the trade. Yet the distance between the two meant Lima was relatively 
independent of the London concern, and London probably failed to see the situation the 
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same way Lima did. Lima was eager to enter the trade, and London probably did not see 
this. On matters of “long-term policy,” the distance was not much of an issue for Lima 
and London, but the guano correspondences required fast responses and negotiations to 
be confirmed or denied in days, so there was not really a chance for consultation with 
London anyways.
130
 
The Lima branch of Gibbs’ decision to enter the trade in Peru at a time when 
guano was overall unknown in Europe was received by London with uncertainty. 
William Gibbs considered entrance into the trade an act “of insanity,” and the manager 
expressed regrets about their entrance into the trade not long after the contract was 
concluded, saying he worried about the consequences of their decision.
131
These concerns 
were completely justified. Guano was a newer fertilizer, untested by some farmers. It was 
not yet popular enough. Regardless of all the praise chemists, journalists, and 
agriculturalists published about it, farmers were only just learning how best to apply it 
and how it compared with other fertilizers. Furthermore, Gibbs was very cautious. They 
operated through “safer forms of mercantile enterprise,” and did not take unnecessary 
risks. They had certainly invested a lot in guano by sending very heavy amounts of 
money to a country with a bad history of paying back debts on a commodity that was still 
new.
132
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 Almost from the beginning, the two English consignees, Myers and Gibbs, argued 
over prices. It was not until the 1850’s that the government took a more deliberate role in 
dictating prices. However, during the 1840’s, price changes had to be approved by the 
Peruvian government, which still indicates the level of control the government had. 
Myers was always aiming for higher prices while Gibbs preferred more moderate prices. 
Gibbs argued that prices that were too high did not promote the growth of the market, and 
therefore aimed for lower prices than Gibbs. The House of Gibbs believed it was better to 
sell more guano at a more realistic price, even if the profit in the end was smaller. Myers, 
on the other hand, was more of a gambling man while Gibbs preferred patience and 
necessary sacrifices. In 1842, the price of guano was initially wide, ranging from £10 to 
£20 per ton, but by 1843 Gibbs and Myers agreed on a fixed minimum of £12. In 
January, they again reached an agreement of £10 per ton, at Gibbs’ request. While Myers 
complained of the need to go higher, Gibbs argued for “steady, large and increasing 
annual sales.”133 William Gibbs wrote in 1842 that “To spread want throughout the 
country, we must spread the manure even at a slight sacrifice; and to do this we must in a 
manner force dealers and consumers to buy.”134Their agreement for £10 per ton lasted 
until 1846, when it was lowered to £8 to £9, and then brought back up the following year 
to £10.
135
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 In the beginning, the government did not have much power over the contractors. 
The conditions of the very first contract favored the merchants, but only a few years later 
it was clear the government was in total control. The merchants were at their mercy. For 
example, the contractors were forced to ask the government for an extension of 3 years to 
export the specified amount of guano. This was granted to them by the government, who 
had the power to cancel their contract at any time.  
 By 1843, sales had drastically increased since the beginning of the trade, and 
William Gibbs happily recorded that guano was now the favorite manure in Europe. In 
order to boost sales, however, the contractors had to promote Peruvian guano overseas to 
increase interest and sales. Gibbs and Myers both published advertisements in pamphlets, 
newspapers, and journals.
136
  As much friction that existed between Myers and Gibbs, 
they published together Peruvian and Bolivian Guano: Its Nature, Properties, and 
Results in 1844. This publication contained different testimonies of people who used 
guano and received positive results. For example, Thomas Newman wrote: “The guano 
which I received from you last spring I used on various fields, and the result, I am happy 
to say, has been perfectly satisfactory.” The publication also warned that the public 
“should not be led to believe…that all kinds are alike.” They wrote about inferior guano 
that could be found on the market, and praised Peruvian guano for its price, portability, 
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and versatility that “adapted more or less to every quality of land, and to almost every 
vegetable production.”137 
 
The Threat of African Competition 
As much influence as Gibbs wielded in the trade, they, like all the other export 
houses, were not immune to competition in the world market. In 1843, shortly after the 
arrival of Gibbs in the guano trade, the contractors were faced with an alarming source of 
competition.
138Gibbs’ business rival, Andrew Livingstone of Liverpool, dropped several 
shiploads of guano onto the British market from an island called Ichaboe off the coast of 
Africa. Ichaboe, a tiny rock, was covered in at least 25 feet of guano, an estimate of about 
200,000 tons.
139
African guano, which mostly came from the two islands of Possession 
and Ichaboe, was certainly less valuable than Peru’s because of the climate. The rainfall 
the African islands received lowered the quantity of nitrogen. Even though Peruvian 
guano was the far more valuable guano, the guano from Africa was cheaper, and it 
“threw into disarray the price calculations” of the contractors in Peru.140It sold at the 
average price of £7 per ton, sometimes as low as £5 per ton, while Peruvian guano was 
                                                          
137
 Antony Gibbs & Sons including Myers’ Contributions, Peruvian and Bolivian Guano: Its Nature, 
Properties, and Results: with an Account of Authentic Experiments Made with it in Great Britain, France, 
and America: Together with instructions for Using it, (London: S. Sands, 1844), 4-5, 7-8.  
 
138
 Mathew, The House of Gibbs and the Peruvian Guano Monopoly, 55-57.  
 
139
 Skaggs, 8.  
 
140
 Hollett, 112, 142.  
 
 
51 
 
around £10 per ton.
141
Gibbs was adamant about holding the price of Peruvian guano in 
the midst of African competition. William Gibbs was headstrong that they must be “firm 
as rock” and hold the price at £10. He did not want to go lower for fear that after the 
threat of African guano ended, the contractors would have a difficult time pulling the 
price back up to a more suitable number.
142
The Lima manager agreed, and reported to 
London that a moderate price had to be maintained throughout. They had to be steadfast 
to get the point through to the government and their fellow contractors that they would 
not lower the price. By 1844, “African mania” was spreading, much to the concern of 
Gibbs. In August of that year, over 200 ships were seen waiting to load guano at the 
African island of Ichaboe. By December, there were more than 400 ships in the congested 
island waters. However, it was shortly after this time that reports began circulating 
around business circles concerning the impending exhaustion of the African guano.  
African guano was a short-lived “formidable” threat to Peruvian guano.143The 
peak of African guano came in 1845, when British imports reached 254,527 tons. By the 
end of that year, however, the islands were “more or less cleared.” The other, smaller 
African islands, although commercially insignificant, were quickly used up.  By the end 
of 1845, the African trade was essentially over. However brief the competitive period 
may have been, it severely checked “sales of Peruvian for a year or two.” In the long-run, 
the position of Peruvian fertilizer, the more potent of the two, was “undoubtedly 
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strengthened.” Purchasers turned back to Peru’s guano once the African supply was no 
longer available, and although they preferred African guano’s low prices, farmers were 
overall much happier with the quality of the plants that Peruvian guano grew.
144
  
 
The End of the Decade 
 By 1847, Myers decided he was leaving the trade when the contract expired. He 
had been considering leaving for some time, but the constant bickering with Gibbs over 
guano prices and the fear of ruin from African competition confirmed his decision.
145
 
Unlike Gibbs, Myers constantly wanted to go lower on prices while Gibbs rejected 
lowering prices. They saw it as a scheme to get richer faster that ultimately proved 
disastrous in the end. At times over the years, Gibbs became exhausted with the business, 
too. The Lima manager reportedly complained about the entire guano market, and in 
1845 Gibbs angrily wrote that they wanted to be free from the “risky business.”146 
Regardless of their occasional grievances during the first decade of the guano trade, by 
the end of the 1840’s they were more positive about the future of their business, as the 
market looked more secure and they would have the business mainly to themselves.  
In December of 1847, Gibbs secured a contract in which they were the sole 
British importers. They were required to export 100,000 tons of guano between June of 
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1848 and December of 1849. With Myers no longer part of the contract, Quiroz Allier & 
Company left the trade at the end of 1847. The men who started the trade were now no 
longer a part of it.  The Peruvian government had confidence in the House of Gibbs, and 
they had proven themselves to be satisfactory businessmen who could be counted on for 
their sizeable loans to Peru. Their price policies were realistic, and they successfully had 
proven their case for a steady, fixed price. The House did not waver in these policies, and 
actively sought to maintain a firm price policy because buyers had come to expect 
consistency in price. If they suddenly altered the price, either too high or too low, it was 
bound to lead to confusion, anger those who submitted payment before the change in 
price, and “compromise their good will. If the price was to be fixed, though, it had to be 
set at a moderate and competitive level.”147Yet it is still worth noting that although they 
had a significant amount of sway in setting prices, their prices were always approved by 
the Peruvian government. Their managers had done very well advertising guano 
overseas, and they were now experienced in the trade. They had an extensive contact list 
that included shippers and dealers. 
As the 1840’s ended, Peruvian guano reigned superior throughout the world as the 
most valuable fertilizer. There was almost no competition. After Peru, the most important 
sources for guano were found in Chile, West Africa, and Patagonia, from which Britain 
imported 4,311 tons, 2,345 tons, and 1,945 tons, respectively, in 1849.
148
 That same year, 
British imports from Peru totaled over 73,000 tons. Gibbs, now alone in the trade, were 
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looking forward to the upcoming decade, and had overall had a very successful decade in 
Peru. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE HEIGHT OF THE GUANO TRADE: 
Gibbs in the Guano Trade During the 1850’s, Guano Labor, Accusations Against 
Gibbs, and the Relationship Between Gibbs and The Peruvian Government 
 
Gibbs and Guano in the 1850’s  
 In December of 1847, Gibbs was almost alone in the Peruvian guano trade. They 
alone controlled the British markets. They had every market in Europe except France 
since it was in the hands of Michel Montané et Compagne in Paris.
149
In 1853, they 
received a 6-year extension on their 1850 contract, which ended in 1861. This 1850 
contract excluded Gibbs from France, the United States, and the Spanish market. They 
gained the West Indies and Australia in 1854. In 1858, after Peru became annoyed with 
how the French consignees handled business, Gibbs received France and French colonial 
markets around the same time they received the Spanish markets.
150
By the end of the 
decade, the only important areas out of their control were the United States, the 
Caribbean Asia, and Central America. These markets were all mostly controlled by 
Peruvian contractors. Gibbs was happy to have these markets, but they did not ask for 
them. Rather, the Peruvian government gave it to them. The initiative came from the 
government rather than the merchants, an indication of the level of control the 
government executed over the merchants. They had developed their reputation for 
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moderate prices, which had been a problem for them when they were in the trade with 
fellow Englishman Myers. Gibbs was never willing to jeopardize its reputation for 
temporary gain, and were adamant about maintaining their price policies. As the 1850’s 
progressed, the government became more involved with the pricing of guano. Rather than 
simply approving it, they began arguing for a higher price since they were the owners of 
a “wasting resource.” They wanted to get as much as they possibly could before their 
sources were depleted.
151
  
 In 1853, Britain had become extremely concerned about the supply of guano left 
at the Chincha Islands. Admiral Fairfax Moresby was sent to dispel rumors about the 
dwindling supply of guano and get the truth about how much more could be taken. He 
estimated that the guano would last 8 or 9 more years.
152
He observed how many ships 
took how much guano in a certain amount of time, and calculated that about 8,600,000 
tons of guano remained at the three Chincha Islands. Three weeks after his report was 
published, an agricultural expert from Britain named James Caird challenged Moresby’s 
findings. He claims these estimations were conducted too quickly to meet a publication 
deadline, and they were supposed to be “paper friendly to the guano monopoly.”  He then 
claimed France had also sent representatives to try to estimate how much guano was left, 
and their numbers were much lower: 12,000,000 tons left on the islands. On top of this, 
the Peruvian government had made their own guesses, which was about 26,000,000 tons 
left. Caird ignored the Peruvian estimate, and instead took the average of the French and 
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English estimates to conclude that 10,300,000 tons of guano remained.
153
Caird believed 
the other, smaller islands in Peru that contained guano brought the total closer to 
18,800,000 tons. While Moresby believed guano would not last more than a decade, 
Caird believed it would last several decades. This proved to be a gross overestimate, and 
Moresby’s was an underestimate. 
 The 1850’s was a prosperous, busy decade for Gibbs and the guano trade. During 
this decade, more than half the guano exports went to Britain. British farmers were 
quicker than American farmers to apply Peruvian guano to their fields, yet America was 
also a huge market for guano. A British officer reported in the middle of the decade that 
there were 100 ships flying 11 different flags in Peruvian waters, simultaneously loading 
guano. There were 44 American ships and 40 British ships representing the two countries 
which provided the biggest markets for Peruvian guano. The rest of the ships represented 
the countries of Peru, Armenia, Sweden, Russia, France, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium. Beyond these ships, more could be found out at sea, waiting their turn to 
load.
154
Other travelers witnessed similar events, where ships of various countries were 
sitting out in the ocean for weeks at a time, waiting to load.
155
 
 During the 1850’s, high prices were a worrying issue for consumers of guano, and 
these high prices were instigated by the Peruvian government. While most historians 
agree that the house of Gibbs was important to the guano trade, they sometimes disagree 
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on whose fault it really was that the trade collapsed. These high prices ultimately led to 
farmers looking for other alternatives, which was a cause for the decline in the trade. The 
government constantly wanted higher prices on guano to obtain the highest possible 
gains. One newspaper contained the complaint of an angry customer who, in 1857, 
bought 30 tons of guano each for £13 per ton. The season before, they had purchased the 
same amount for £11 per ton.
156
Yet despite these high prices, people continued to buy 
guano. Guano’s reputation as one of the most powerful and economical manures on the 
market was due to the fact that “when properly applied, it has seldom or never failed to 
produce the most satisfactory crops, and if instances of failures have occurred, they may 
be traced directly, either to some other than Peruvian guano, or to a…lack of judgment in 
the application.”157Farmers in Britain proved they wanted the guano, and would spend the 
necessary money to get it, even if they were going to complain a little. Despite prices 
being higher, the 1850’s was still the best decade of the guano trade. Sales were at their 
highest, and both sales and prices reached their peak in 1856. In that year, Gibbs alone 
sold 211,647 tons of guano in Britain. By December of 1856, the price of guano per ton 
was £13. It stayed this high until the following summer.
158
 
 Farmers got most annoyed over price rises when the merchants gave them a price 
and the farmers placed their orders “on the faith of this agreement.” However, when the 
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merchants were told they would not have the guano at the time it was promise, and then 
the merchants told the farmers they could not deliver the guano promised, it greatly upset 
the farmers. The farmers liked to buy guano at certain times of the year depending on the 
crops. They complained that if this was “the true representation of the case, we must say 
that the conduct of the agents affords ground for serious complaint.” Although farmers 
were not entirely happy about paying so much for the guano, the real issue to them was 
that a promise had been made to them by the merchants that they now could not deliver 
on. If there had not been a promise made “of delivering it at a lower price, we have no 
reason to complain of an advance in it.”159  
  People also complained about the delay due to the congested waters off the 
islands, where ships waited sometimes months to get guano. It could then take several 
days to load. Ships were anchored for so long that captains and their crew got so bored 
they frequently went fishing.
160
  The trade was clogged “with obstructions from the first 
chartering of the ship to the final delivery of the cargo.” Problems with irregularities in 
supply were more frequent in the 1850’s, usually due to conditions loading at the islands. 
In the Farmer’s Magazine, farmers complained about the problems with supply. One of 
the most “respectable manure-dealers was, for the first time…directly refused. They 
could not even promise him any further supply. When people have gradually accustomed 
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themselves to the matter-of-course use of anything, the unexpected want of it must be 
severely felt.”161  
Guano Labor 
 Under the contract with the government, the export contractors were responsible 
for arranging the supply of labor and equipment to get guan off the islands. They then 
deducted the charges from the total proceeds. The contract stipulated that the equipment, 
brought in from the contractors, would become the government’s property after the 
contract ended. Like many foreign merchants during the nineteenth century, Gibbs were 
removed from the guano extraction process. They had very little involvement in the 
physical loading and digging of guano at the islands. In the early 1840’s, much of the 
loading process from the Chincha Islands was overseen by Barroilhet and the members of 
the French firm of Dutez. By the end of the decade, most of the production business had 
been handed over to subcontractors, first Cipriano Román then Domingo Elías and 
Andrés Alvarez Calderón.
162
In 1849, the Peruvian government drew up separate contracts 
with loaders, and put Domingo Elías in charge. He was a wealthy owner of haciendas, a 
man whose wealth was “chiefly in land and slaves” on the mainland not far from the 
guano islands.
163Elías held “high office, was once indeed in charge of the executive for a 
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few weeks…and is one of the leading men of Peru.”164He was also a driving force behind 
the immigration law that imported foreign colonists because of a problem of labor 
shortage.  
 Unlike most other commodities, guano required primitive technology, literally 
shovels and bags at first. No processing was required, and there were no large costs to 
transport it since it was already on an island where ships were just waiting offshore. Each 
worker was required to dig and wheel a certain amount of guano to the ships each day, 
usually about five tons per day.
165
It usually took about a month or more to load up only 
one ship with guano.
166
The guano was so hard and compacted that it sometimes had to be 
blasted apart with gunpowder, the sane and stones were separated, and then the guano 
went to the ships. A traveler to Peru wrote several decades after the peak of the guano age 
that “No hell has ever been conceived…that can be equaled to the fierceness of its heat, 
the horror of its stink, and the damnation of those compelled to labor there, to a deposit of 
Peruvian guano when being shoveled into ships.”167  
 Those who did the physical labor of digging trenches and chiseling out guano all 
day long were almost never there by choice. At first, convicts and army deserters were 
recruited to work the islands until the introduction of the Chinese coolie system in 1849. 
Since slaves were tied up on plantations and the “city proletariat” and “indigenous 
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mountain groups” could not be expected to come running for much work, convicts and 
those who deserted the arm were forced to carry out most of the work.
168
Between 1849 
and 1875, as many as 90,000 coolies were brought in from China to work, but almost 
10,000 died en route. Most never returned home.  Though the coolies were not legally 
slaves and freely entered into the arrangements, they were more like indentured servants. 
Whatever their contracts stated, they were in effect “absolutely slaves…without any title, 
or rights, or conceded customs-mere over-worked beasts of burden.”169  However, the 
arrangements into which they entered were more often than not deceitful, and many left 
for Peru in a state of total ignorance about what kind of work they would be doing or 
where they would end up. They were brought to the country under false pretenses, under 
what they are told are five-year contracts in which they would be working in gold 
mines.
170
Once they got to Peru they were split up, with most being sent to work on 
plantations or railroads. Others went to work on the guano islands alongside army 
deserters, convicts, some hired labor, and a handful of slaves.  
 The suicide rate of Chinese workers was high. Some threw themselves overboard 
before they reached South America. Many others threw themselves off cliffs, “smoked a 
little too much opium, or were shot, or all these causes were put together.”171 Anyone 
who tried to escape was executed. According to one bystander, one worker accidentally 
                                                          
168
 Levin, 35-37. 
  
169
 Peck, 206.  
 
170
 Levin, 86-88. Mathew, ‘A Primitive Export Sector: Guano Production in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Peru,’ 
40-43. Peck, 206.  
171
 Duffield, 43.  
 
 
 
63 
 
broke a piece of equipment, and rather than face his horrible punishment, he jumped off 
the cliff. They lived in filthy sheds, were fed only 2 daily meals, and slept on grass mats 
for beds, “without a ray of hope that their condition will be ever bettered…the shadows 
of night provide him with nothing but dreams of the tormenting routine which awaits him 
to-morrow…he has not even the melancholy comfort that he will be decently buried 
when he dies.”172They worked more than 20 hours a day normally, 6 days a week. 
Workers received 3 reales, 2 of these withheld for food.
173
American traveler, George W. 
Peck, wrote in 1854 that the system of labor maintained on the Chincha Islands seemed to 
him to be “a kind of human abattoir, a slaughter-house of men; and I feel a relief in being 
away from them, as one feels who has escaped out of some gloomy dream.”174 When 
Gibbs was briefly put in charge, conditions got slightly better for the workers. A hospital 
was established in the first half of the decade with a British doctor in charge.
175
  
 
Accusations Against Gibbs 
Despite the complaints that appeared about the entirety of the guano trade during 
the 1850’s, none were louder than the complaints about Gibbs. During their years in the 
guano trade, the House of Gibbs was “handsomely abused, while they were 
consignees…by the Peruvian journalists and pamphleteers for selfishly selling too cheap, 
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and at the same time by the English papers for selfishly selling too dear.”176 In 1849, Sir 
Robert Peel wrote to the foreign secretary Lord Palmerston that the Gibbs monopoly on 
guano did not serve the interests of anyone except for Gibbs. He further advised the entire 
monopoly-consignment export system be abolished. A decade later, Luis Mesones agreed 
with him, citing the system as corrupt and “vicious.”177  
 Carlos Barroilhet, one of the original contractors in the trade, was one of the more 
vocal critics of Gibbs in the 1850’s. In the late 1840’s, when he was officially out of the 
guano trade he had helped start, Barroilhet angrily began writing about the 
mismanagement of the trade. He argued that guano offered great opportunities than 
anyone in Peru had initially realized, and the country’s “natural monopoly of guano ought 
to be exploited to the full through a more ambitious pricing policy and the returns would 
be sufficient to ensure a speedy clearance of the foreign debt. The Gibbs house, however, 
was standing in the way.” He further argued their involvement had been a “complete 
disaster, a public calamity.”  His criticisms were more emotionally charged, and it is 
possible he was trying to find his way back into the trade. He managed to argue his case 
with Congress, but it fell on unsympathetic ears. In fact, many congressmen defended 
Gibbs against Barroilhet’s accusations.178  
 President Castilla was also very unsympathetic, but since Barroilhet included 
Castilla in his accusations, in September of 1857 the Convención Nacional held a debate 
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based on his charges. The resolution was to send commissioners to France, Britain, and 
the United States to see if guano had been sold at unnecessarily low prices, and to see if 
the contractors were operating according to the terms of their respective contracts. 
Manuel Basagoitia was sent to the House of Gibbs in London, a move which was 
apparently anticipated by Gibbs. They do not appear to have been bothered by his visit, 
and in 1858 the government published a resolution stating they had found “no charges of 
misconduct…sustained against Gibbs.”This did not slow the attacks on them, however. 
They were still accused of fraudulent behavior, mostly an extension of Barroilhet’s 
criticism that Gibbs purposely kept prices too low to receive higher commissions and that 
they received more than they deserved for the services they performed. These arguments 
came from other native Peruvian writers like Luis Mesones and José Ulloa, who believed 
Gibbs made too much money in commissions and had been cleared erroneously by 
Basagoitia.
179
 
 A few historians believe Gibbs took advantage of the system to earn a higher 
profit. Jonathan Levin argues that Gibbs sold at excessively low prices, and argues in The 
Export Economies: Their Pattern of Development in Historical Perspective (1960) that 
Gibbs purposely kept intermediate costs like shipping and loading higher than necessary 
to earn more. They earned on a commission basis, and that commission came from the 
gross proceeds. Therefore, the higher the total proceeds, the higher their share. Levin 
further argues that while the government tried to set the highest possible prices per ton on 
guano, Gibbs tried to keep prices down, against because their commission came from 
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gross sales. If the total sales “could be increased by lowering the price per ton…their 
interest lay in selling at a low price.” Therefore, if Levin’s argument is correct, then the 
higher intermediate costs and deliberate attempt to lower prices meant the government 
suffered losses while Gibbs earned more.
180
  
 Research conducted by historians in the following decades, including W.M. 
Mathew, argue against this, citing these claims by Levin as “largely mythical.” Mathew 
says that, if anything, “the consignees can be more easily faulted for keeping prices too 
high than for effecting unnecessary reductions.”181There was never a persistent fall in 
prices, as Levin argues. The price varied tremendously per ton in the first two years of the 
guano trade, fetching anywhere from £14 to £28 per ton until the government got more 
involved with prices. From 1843 to 1847, guano sold at £10 per ton. There was a brief 
period in 1846 when the contractors lowered it to £8 or £9 per ton at Myers’ request. It 
was brought back up in 1847 to £10 per ton.
182
  By now the government was actively 
dictating prices to the contractors. It sold anywhere from £9 to £10 per ton in the early 
1850’s.183 The price then slowly climbed from £10 to £11 to £12, and then in 1856 it was 
raised to £13 per ton.
184
The price was reduced to £12, where it stayed for the remainder 
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of Gibbs’ involvement in the trade.185  Therefore, there was never a fall in prices but 
rather prices were higher at the government’s insistence.  
Gibbs argued against excessive reductions, and instead chose to sell at a steady 
price.
186
 They wanted price rises rather than reductions in the spring of both 1853 and 
1854, 1858, and in the early 1860’s before their departure from the trade.187Gibbs knew 
that a reduction in price did not promise demand. Buyers who noticed a reduction in price 
were often tempted to hold off on purchases, hoping that the price may be further 
reduced. The risk of angering people who bought guano before the effect of a price fall 
was also a reason not to tangle with prices.
188
 Furthermore, the government wanted the 
highest possible prices per ton of guano, and Gibbs obviously wanted to please the 
government so they could stay in the trade. They would not jeopardize their position in 
guano by deliberately going lower when the government obviously wanted higher 
prices.
189
  
 Many of the guano vessels sailing for Britain docked at London, but other popular 
ports included Leith, Aberdeen, Glasgow, Dublin, Plymouth, Liverpool, Hull, and 
Bristol. When guano vessels docked, the guano was weighed by Customs House officials 
and certificates were given to the consignees. These were sent back to the Lima 
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administration along with details of the sales. Guano was then stored in a warehouse until 
it was further distributed.
190
The London house updated the Peruvian government usually 
every 15 days. Peru claimed the returns, of which half were set aside for British 
bondholders. From the gross proceeds, Gibbs took their cut for intermediate costs, and 
Peru got the remainder.
191
  
 Gibbs can be blamed for unevenly distributing the guano to raise profit. Most of 
the guano went to London, but was not used as much as it was in other places. Guano was 
popular in the north for example, and so there was another charge for transporting the 
guano from London to other houses where it was then sold, earning Gibbs a small extra 
profit that added up. They were also guilty of stock-piling guano in the last year of their 
contract when they decided they would probably not be getting another one.
192
Not only 
did this complicate the transfer of control, but it gave Gibbs guano to continue to sell 
after their contract was over. They also charged excessively for bags for the guano, a 
charge they felt they were entitled to make.
193
They did earn a little extra profit in these 
ways, and they received about 2% just for residing over the business, as well, thereby 
earning “an unfair reward” which most people felt they did not deserve.194 Yet despite 
this extra profit they earned, there is no evidence Gibbs purposely kept the government 
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poor or exercised an unbalanced amount of power in the guano trade. The government 
needed Gibbs, and Castilla reportedly said in 1849 the only reason Gibbs was in the trade 
at all was because he wanted to “see Peru’s credit established on a firm basis.” The 
established House of Gibbs was his way to do that.
195
  
 Their monopoly was challenged at time even by non-Peruvian nationals. Farmers 
back in Britain started complaining loudly in the 1850’s about the monopoly. When 
problems with supply became more frequent, an issue that usually resulted from delays in 
the loading process, farmers wrote to the Royal Agricultural Society of England about 
getting guano from anywhere else. If guano could be secured from somewhere else, then 
“the principle of monopoly is broken through when once we can establish an opposition 
to it.”196  
 
The Relationship Between Gibbs and the Peruvian Government 
 In the unique relationship that existed between the British contractors in the house 
of Gibbs and Peru’s government, it is clear the government was the stronger party who 
received the “lion’s share of any ensuing profits.” The two had a mutually convenient 
relationship: the government needed Gibbs for their money, and Gibbs needed Peru for 
the guano to make profit. Their cozy relationship was pivotal to the entire trade, and this 
relationship was very unique compared to merchants in other trades in other countries. 
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Gibbs was one of the most powerful mercantile houses backed by resources in London. 
Peru was a disunited country without much money. They benefitted each other.  
 The government was clearly in control, and since they employed Gibbs, they 
could also dismiss them whenever they wanted. Gibbs, therefore, wanted to keep the 
government happy. They did not sell guano at excessively low prices, since this would 
contradict the desires of their employers, the Peruvian government. They also wanted to 
achieve a high level of returns as well since this was how they were repaid for the large 
loans they advanced the government. There was a lack of real security for the merchants. 
The government could cancel the contracts whenever they wanted, which they sometimes 
did. In 1845, when Román Castilla’s government wanted another loan, they threatened to 
break their contracts with Gibbs and give their business to someone else if they did not 
get the loan they wanted. Gibbs had to pay the 300,000 pesos the government wanted to 
stay in the trade because they knew the government’s threats were real. The government 
needed cash, and if Gibbs did not give them what they desired, then the firm could easily 
be replaced. They knew how easily disposable they were.
197
  
 The government was also the dominant party in issue on prices. In the 1840’s, the 
government approved the prices but they were mostly initiated by the merchants. In the 
1850’s the government was totally in control. They listened to Gibbs when they advised 
for or against a certain change in price, but in the end, it was the solely the decision of the 
government. They took clear charge of the price policy, and the contractors had to abide 
by what they said to keep them happy. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
By the 1900’s, most of the large mercantile houses that had been critical to trade 
in South America were extinct. Only a few small houses were still strong and profitable, 
including Gibbs. As the twentieth century progressed, they all became less important. 
There were four other large mercantile houses that survived into the twentieth century on 
the West Coast. Like Gibbs, they built extensive businesses that usually operated in more 
than one country. Balfour Williamson conducted business in both Peru and Chile, like 
Gibbs, and also took equity stakes in railroad, water, and nitrate companies.
198
Duncan 
Fox had similar investing interests with Gibbs, like copper and nitrate. W. and J. Lockett 
imported wines until they joined forced with a British nitrate entrepreneur, and Graham 
Rowe specialized in sugar production and invested in banks and railroads in Chile.
199
 
 Between 1870 and 1914, the remaining British merchant house became direct 
investors on a large scale. They responded to “unexpected opportunities, or…the assets 
seized from bad debts were used to build new business streams.” They were almost all 
located on the West Coast, or in Argentina or Brazil, where the smaller, weaker houses 
had been long gone. After 1914, British houses disappeared one by one. The financial 
crises that occurred after the war and the Depression hurt the surviving 
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merchants.
200Britain lost her position as the “world’s leading capital exporter during the 
First World War to the United States, while the City of London lost its pre-eminence as 
the world’s largest international financial centre as New York and Paris grew in 
importance.”201 
 
The End of Gibbs in Guano 
 Gibbs’ contract ended in December of 1861 after they received a 6-year extension 
in 1853. When they were awarded this extension, there was a fair amount of criticism 
over the way in which this had been handled, mostly because they were conducted too 
secretively. There was never any competitive bidding, so nobody else had the chance to 
compete for the contract. In May of 1860, the government publicly announced they were 
inviting proposals for the contracts, but made it clear they would give preference to 
Peruvians. At this point, the local mercantile class had grown significantly and enlarged 
its ability to compete for guano contracts. This group of local merchants were in a much 
better position than they had been almost two decades ago to take the place of Gibbs. 
They worked in other markets, like Central America and Cuba, and the local elite had 
become wealthier which facilitated entry into the trade. The mood in Peru was one of 
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exasperation with the foreign dominance in the trade. Peruvians wanted indigenous 
capitalists to take over.
202
  
 Gibbs left peacefully, but amid much confusion. The government never explicitly 
told Gibbs they had to leave the trade. There were rumors that President Ramón Castilla 
did not want them to leave but could not keep them because they were the subject of 
criticism. Rumors even circulated there would be a revolution if Gibbs received another 
contract instead of it going to a Peruvian firm.
203
Their position had been challenged, and 
there were too many complaints about their contracts and their conduct. Peru wanted to 
see locals in control and not Gibbs. Not surprisingly, when Gibbs left the trade the critics 
suddenly got quiet. It is very likely Gibbs’ critics only wanted the trade out of their hands 
and with native Peruvians rather than wealthy foreigners.  
 Gibbs apparently did not care to submit another bid for a contract, but Henry 
Gibbs though the government would soon realize how badly they needed them when the 
new contractors could not fill the shoes of Gibbs. Still, the house was not interested in 
remaining in the trade, mainly because Henry Gibbs thought the stipulations were 
becoming harsher. They were not invited to submit a bid, and the government kept their 
distance from them, probably because of local “sensitivities.” Gibbs was not interested in 
remaining in the trade with so many enemies now in Lima. They planned to continue to 
stay in the trade for a few more years to sell off old stocks they had accumulated, but 
were looking at moving into other business ventures by making use of “the liquid capital 
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guano had brought them.” In fact, they may have looked forward to leaving the trade. 
Henry Gibbs wrote in 1860 that “with the capital that this business will set free, other 
good business will no doubt come tumbling in as fast as we can welcome it.”204 When 
Gibbs’ contract ended, their territories in Europe were divided up between a number of 
new Peruvian contractors.  
After the guano trade, Gibbs began to diversity their business after the guano 
trade, which brought them “expansion and substantial success.” Like several of the other 
surviving merchant houses in the second half of the century, Gibbs expanded into a 
multi-regional business group. They still participated in a wide range of commission 
trading, and became a major issuing house. They became interested in government bonds, 
from which they profited well, and they expanded their business. They supplied nitrate, 
copper, wool, cotton, and other commodities. In the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, they had a flour milling business.  Gibbs was both a trader and one of the largest 
producers in the Peruvian nitrate trade, which later belonged to Chile after the War of 
Pacific when Peru lost her nitrate fields. The transition from guano to nitrates was 
natural, since the story of the two were intimately connected. Nitrate also served as a 
fertilizer as well as an explosive, and the industry was dependent on foreign capital, 
expertise, and enterprise. Yet nitrate developed on fundamentally different lines. 
Peruvian guano was a government monopoly. Unlike the guano monopoly, the nitrate 
trade meant Gibbs had more competition. Gibbs’ Valparaíso branch wrote to London in 
1876 that Peru’s nitrate business “is by no means a monopoly and it is extremely doubtful 
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whether it will ever become so.”205 Guano was owned by the government, and Gibbs only 
exported it because they gave the government loans in exchange for selling rights. The 
nitrate deposits were exploited by private capital, mostly of British or Chilean 
origin.
206
Gibbs was also much more involved in the production of nitrate, whereas in 
guano they kept their distance.  By the 1870’s, guano was but a distant memory for the 
House of Gibbs, and the Lima branch closed in 1880. 
 
The Decline of Guano 
 One of the major reasons for the decline in the need for guano as a fertilizer was 
due to the rise of other fertilizers like superphosphates. Superphosphates were high in 
phosphate, and were mixed with either sulfuric acid or phosphoric acid. These were 
widely available, and were cheaper than guano. In the late 1850’s, chemists and 
agriculturalists began arguing that some crops, especially turnips, needed phosphatic 
fertilizers rather than nitrogenous fertilizers. Artificial fertilizers began to gain more 
importance on the market. There were also nitrogenous fertilizers that were becoming 
more popular by the end of the decade, including sulphate of ammonia and nitrate of 
soda.
207
  By the end of the First World War, mixed fertilizers were very popular on the 
markets, and very little guano was taken from Peru.   
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 The reason farmers began employing the use of substitutes on their crops, 
however, was due to the high prices placed on Peruvian guano by Peru’s government. 
Farmers did not just want lower prices, they also wanted a better system of importing “by 
which current short-term irregularities of supply could be removed.” They complained 
about the length of time it took to get guano, and complained about the Peruvian 
government choosing to raise prices, apparently unconcerned or completely oblivious to 
the farmers’ anger.208 These prices were forcing the farmers to look elsewhere. Farmers 
had gotten so used to guano and had grown to love it so much for their fields that it had 
caused them to “neglect very much other most useful and important manures.”209  
 The guano industry and constant human industrial activity caused the birds to 
leave the islands. What had once been a quiet, uninhabited island for birds to nest became 
a busy hub of activity, with a tiny village in it for 1,000 people to live in.
210
 A traveler to 
Peru wrote that he visited the islands right before the start of the guano trade, and the 
Chincha Islands were the huge, quiet, peaceful home of hundreds of birds. The islands 
were “bold, brown heads, tall and erect, standing out of the sea like living things, 
reflecting the light of heaven…Now these same islands looked like creatures whose 
heads had been cut off…like anything in short that reminds one of death and the 
grave.”211 
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CONCLUSION  
“The House of Gibbs that made their dibs 
By selling turds of foreign birds.”212 
 
 Before the 1970’s, it was widely assumed that Gibbs controlled the guano trade 
and the government was at the mercy of the contractors. Historians like W.M. Mathew, 
Jonathan Levin, Rory Miller, and Frederick B. Pike began to re-examine the guano trade 
as interest in South America once again began to peak, mostly from the United States. 
These historians argued Gibbs was critical to the guano trade in the nineteenth century in 
Peru, but they did not control it. They were a crucial party, but not the only ones. The 
government was mostly in control of the trade, and they were the ones who dictated the 
terms and conditions that Gibbs had to follow. As the other contractors dropped out, soon 
Gibbs had almost the whole trade to themselves, with a few exceptions. As complaints 
against them mounted, they were forced to leave the trade and look elsewhere for 
profitable South American ventures, mostly in Chilean nitrate.  
The issue was once again revisited as historians and scientists began to write 
about the effects of capitalism on the environment. An interest in humanitarian rights 
might also have contributed to recent scholarship on Peru’s guano trade, since Chinese 
coolies were central to the labor used for guano. John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark, David 
Hollett, and Gregory T. Cushman have all contributed to the historiography on the guano 
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trade from a different stance, yet they also agree that Gibbs was critical to the guano 
trade. They focus less on the role of the government, and more on the labor and 
economics of the trade.  
Merchants left Britain as the South American countries became independent from 
Spain, and filled the commercial trading void that had opened as a result of Spanish 
control dwindling down before disappearing. Of the many merchants who traveled to 
South America, only a few would survive. Trading proved to be a risky business when 
transportation and communication were slow, and sometimes the necessary capital was 
too much for them to handle. Of the few who survived, the house of Gibbs was one of the 
strongest ones. They were similar to many merchants. Gibbs conducted business in 
similar ways, operated as an export and import house, and had the financial backing 
needed in post-Spanish South America. Merchants were important to trade in South 
America, and Gibbs was one of the strongest, most important and prosperous houses.  
Gibbs was invited to join the Peruvian guano trade, mostly because they had 
money for loans that other merchants did not have access to. Once they were in the guano 
trade, they became the most important factors. Less than a decade after the guano trade 
began, Gibbs were the sole British contractors and had a virtual monopoly on the 
commodity. Their relationship with the government, at times strained due to complaints 
coming from many directions, was somewhat atypical, despite the similarities Gibbs and 
other merchants at the time had. Many merchants worked with private companies, 
whereas Gibbs worked directly with Peru’s government, the sole owner of guano.  
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The government needed Gibbs only because they could offer the most amount of 
money for loans in advance of guano sales. The government’s reliance on loans was 
almost certainly the only reason the guano trade did not go to local Peruvians sooner. 
Peru, caught up in the cycle of borrowing and spending, was dependent on Gibbs’ 
money, but remained the stronger party. They dictated the conditions of the contracts 
with Gibbs, and had the power to annul contracts. Historians do not necessarily agree on 
the innocence of Gibbs’ conduct in the trade, but they do agree that the Peruvian 
government spent money “like a drunken sailor.”213At the dawn of the guano age, guano 
was a “potential source of untold wealth, an organic bonanza that subsequently proved to 
be worth more than all the gold shipped back to Europe.”214Yet after the prosperous 
1850’s and the subsequent decline of guano, Peru was in no better shape than it started in.  
The financial history of the country showed a consistent lack of planning and “an 
apparently untroubled disposition to mortgage the future. There is hardly any evidence to 
suggest that price policies for guano were related to sober and thrifty concern for the 
country’s long-term economic well-being.”215 The short-term budgetary difficulties Peru 
encountered never improved, regardless of the potential wealth guano presented to the 
country. The trade was intimately linked to the state of Peru’s economy and all the 
associated financial issues that were never alleviated or even addressed. It was also linked 
to the merchants. Guano, the main source of revenue for the country during the 
                                                          
213
 Pike, 98. 
  
214
 Hollett, 17. 
  
215
 Mathew, The House of Gibbs and the Peruvian Guano Monopoly, 228.  
 
 
81 
 
nineteenth century, was dependent on the relationship between the government and the 
merchants, specifically the English house of Gibbs.  
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